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AUTHOR'S NOTE
A previous and partial version of this paper has been published as introduction of
Maddalena-Tuzet 2007.
1 Italian pragmatism has been investigated many times by historians of philosophy, but
rarely are scholars of Italian pragmatism, both Italian and foreign, actual pragmatists.1
That is why it has been so often misinterpreted. Here we want to justify the importance of
this small group of people more as representatives of a pragmatist movement than as
singular systematic thinkers. This paper aims to be a pragmatist contribution to the study
of our four philosophers. A contribution that treats them for what they called themselves:
Italian pragmatists. And this makes it possible to see, or at least to glimpse, their “allies
and enemies,” according to the wording of one of Leonardo’s columns, which allows us to
expand our vision to the rest of the Italian and international culture of the age.
2 The center of Italian pragmatism was the periodical Leonardo and the Italian pragmatists
are, above all, those who created and edited Leonardo – namely, Papini and Prezzolini –
and secondly those who joined Leonardo because of their personal friendship with the two
young  intellectuals  and  because  of philosophical  conviction  –  namely  Vailati  and
Calderoni. Then there are all  those who collaborated on Leonardo:  Amendola,  Regalia,
Cecchi, Vacca, Borgese, and many others. We will not concern ourselves with these last
only because their participation was not motivated by the study of pragmatism itself, but
rather by certain affinities between their ideas and the personalities and tastes of the
Leonardians. They were not pragmatism theorists even when they applied it to other
fields, such as zoology, literature or mathematics. It would be necessary to carry out a
study on them specifically, but it behooves us to focus our attention firstly on those who
in some way sought a philosophical formulation of pragmatism. In this sense, Papini,
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Prezzolini, Vailati and Calderoni represent the essence of what we can say about Italian
pragmatism.
3 In  the  first  part  of  the  paper,  it  is  necessary  to  point  out  that  there  were,  in  fact,
philosophers who had an original way of thinking and can be grouped together under a
single name and a national connotation: the Italian pragmatists. Many scholars, in Italy
and abroad, have doubted it, and continue to do so, above all focusing their attention on
the  thought  of  Vailati,  whose  philosophical  interpretation  is  the  real  watershed  for
understanding the Italian movement gathered around the Florentine journal.2
4 It is often claimed that Papini and Prezzolini were confused and conceited “brats” and
that, instead, Vailati and Calderoni were serious scholars who had truly understood the
avant-garde  philosophy  in  America  and  that  they  grafted  it  onto  their  own already
developed studies, thus developing a personal version of it (Garin 1963: 283). If one reads
Leonardo and studies the thought of these authors carefully, one realizes that there was
among the four men a common matrix, and that this was, in effect, the line of the journal
that they, not by chance, proclaimed “the official organ of Italian pragmatism.” As a sign
of their deliberate and substantial commitment, they founded the Florence Pragmatist
Club. It was an attempt to create a non-academic school of philosophical thought (as,
after all, Papini had already tried to do with the Vinci group some years earlier)3 and it
cannot be said that it was simply a sally by young men in search of dramatic gestures.
Certainly, Leonardo’s season of pragmatism was brief, from 1904 until the final phase of
the journal in 1907: that is, from the moment in which the relationship with Vailati and
Schiller  caused  the  ideas  of  Papini  and  Prezzolini  to  evolve  in  a  more  markedly
“pragmatic” sense, abandoning the more generic propositions of the Vinci group (the
part of the group most tied to art distanced themselves and founded Hermes).4
5 The critics have often underestimated the simple and double characteristic of being both
“pragmatists” and “Italians,” which was affirmed by the protagonists of this intellectual
adventure. It is said that pragmatism was not involved or that they had not properly
understood it;  that being Italian did not signal  a peculiarity of  their  philosophy,  but
rather an accident of the philosophical attitude – neopositivist or scientistic or liberal – of
Vailati and Calderoni and of the literary, extravagant and “magical” attitude of Papini
and Prezzolini.  Of course there are reasons to hold this view;5 but we think that the
landscape was a little more complicated than the protagonists themselves sometimes
were maintaining. The reasons for this strange overlooking of that complexity in the
history books can perhaps be traced to the fact that the four men could not easily be
ascribed  to  any  of  the  political  or  philosophical  factions  that  fought  in  Italy  at  the
beginning of the XX century and that went
6 back and forth for the rest of it. When they wrote, the Italian pragmatists were neither
positivists nor idealists, and it was not easy to insert them – then or later – among the
Catholics or the freemasons, the communists or the fascists, the liberals or the socialists.
If we add together this lack of a strong, already consolidated identity to the brevity of the
pragmatists’ season and to the sporadic nature of their writings, as well as an intrinsic
theoretical weakness we will speak about soon, one understands why they were so long
forgotten, and why later, when they were rediscovered, a stronger identity was attributed
to them a posteriori: as precursors to analytical philosophy or to the philosophy of science
or to the action philosophies or to psychology.
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7 What  emerges,  as  we  will  see  in  the  second  part  of  the  paper,  is  that  the  Italian
pragmatists  understood  much  more  about  pragmatism  than  was  said.  Papini  and
Prezzolini were young, but they were not unprepared, and their friendship with Vailati
helped  them greatly  to  grow and to  develop  the  salient  points  of  the  philosophical
problems  that  they  perceived.  One  need  only  read  “Il  pragmatismomesso  in  ordine
[Pragmatism put in order]” (L III/2, April 1905), with its famous assertion of the “corridor
theory,” the “Cronaca pragmatista [Pragmatist chronicle]” (L IV/5, February 1906) where
Papini distinguishes three types of pragmatism and the “Introduzione al pragmatismo
[Introduction to pragmatism]” (L V/1, February 1907), to realize that what we have before
us is not the slapdash aping of a fashionable philosophy. If one looks at the introduction
written  by  Papini,  many  years  later,  to  the  writings  of  Calderoni  and  Vailati  on
pragmatism,6 one  understands  that  the  awareness  of  pragmatist  ideas  and  of  their
importance had not escaped the Florentine writer; one sees instead the signs of a serious
understanding and acceptance of pragmatist theory.
8 In the third part, we will see that there was also a large part of pragmatism that Italian
pragmatists did not grasp because they did not know it. But in their misunderstandings
they signaled a need and possibly a weakness of the whole pragmatist movement.
9 Finally, by indicating the real gap between them and their American “masters,” we will
try to explain and assess the standard interpretation that makes them naïve pragmatists.
Jaime Nubiola, speaks of “Mediterranean pragmatism,” referring to this need to avoid
losing  the  concreteness  of  the  individual  in  the  realization  of  the  universal  laws  of
mathematics and logic, physics and psychology; a need one can find also in Eugenio d’Ors,
Unamuno, Bergson, and Schiller.7
 
I. Not Just “Brats”
10 Papini is recognized, in many ways, as the central figure of Italian pragmatism, albeit
there  are  different  interpretations  on  his  character.  Leonardo  was  his  creature,  as
Prezzolini confirmed in a conversation with Mario Quaranta in 1982, shortly before he
died.8 In the first issues, Prezzolini limited himself to participating with editorials and
other writings. Later he would work side by side with Papini as an editor, also lending a
hand with financial  management.  It  was  in  any event Papini  who decided the  main
direction the journal would take. The different programs of Leonardo were his, from the
first ones in 1903 (n. 1-3) to those which made explicit the pragmatist positions with the
particular meaning given to them by the Leonardians and finally to those of the final
years that were open to occultism. His exuberant personality was the intellectual and
emotional  heart  of  Leonardo.  Papini  decided  the  cover  graphics  with  the  innovative
drawings by De Carolis and the use of pen names – the famous Gian Falco (Papini) and
Giuliano il Sofista [Julian the Sophist] (Prezzolini). He sent Prezzolini to France to meet
Bergson, and then went himself to meet him, later reporting in Leonardo the great French
philosopher’s positions – not without a personal slant and, at times, even a completely
personal, voluntary “misrepresentation.”9 At the same time, he used the content of the
journal to address psychological problems that brought him closer to James’s ideas.10 In
the first years of the XX century, after all, the reception of pragmatism in Italy coincided
with  that  of  James,  even  if  the  reverse  is  not true.11 Papini  and  the  other  Italian
pragmatists  had  a  meeting  with  James  during  the  5th  International  Congress  of
Psychology, held in Rome in 1905: the American philosopher left the meeting enchanted
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by the Florentine writer’s personality.12 It was Papini who became friend with Vailati and
subsequently established a significant epistolary relationship with Miguel de Unamuno,
who recognized him as a privileged interlocutor and was an attentive reader of Leonardo.
It  was also Papini  who wanted to give to the occultists  the possibility  of  expressing
themselves in the columns of the Florentine journal, and in the end, he was the one who
decided to close the journal down.
11 Papini  was  not  only  the  “brat”  who in  the  end showed himself  to  be  a  conformist,
stigmatized by Garin; his thirst to find “a reason to live” was able first to rally the young
people of the Vinci group, and later to charm a protagonist of the cultural scene of the
time like James and a logician of the caliber of Vailati, who would remain bound to him in
a deep, personal friendship full of respect. Certainly, his assertions were often off-key and
were negatively affected by his image because of his youth and time. Papini, however, was
aware of having particular gifts and was convinced he wanted to fight against a world
burdened by affectations and academic formality, bereft of any value for one searching
for a reason to live.
12 Prezzolini was just as witty and a more subtle polemicist than his friend. Perhaps he did
not have the same instinctive philosophical consciousness as Papini, but he followed the
impetus of it. It was Prezzolini who went to meet Bergson and maintained a relationship
with F. C. S. Schiller, the English pragmatist. From his articles on Bergson and Schiller as
from his debate with Calderoni (from L II/3 November 1904 to LIII/2 April 1905) emerges
the stature of a true thinker who not by chance would contribute to the discovery of
authors and themes that otherwise would have remained unknown to the Italian public.
13 Suspicions of connections between the pragmatists and fascism have often fed the critical
studies, especially American ones, and were centered on Prezzolini.13 It is an accusation
that one also finds in De Waal’s book (2004) but which is difficult to document, excepting
a generic observation by Mussolini and a problematic genealogy of fascist thought in La
Voce. The accusation seems, in reality, unfounded: Leonardo’s season ended in 1907 and
Italian pragmatist thought, with its bold individualism and its problems connected with
meaning,  methodology  and  psychology,  provides  very  few  theoretical  pretexts  for
fascism, unless one considers the generic call to action, which, however, is associated
with  almost  all  the  cultural  expressions  of  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century.
Finally, not even the dates favor this interpretation: when there were the pragmatists,
fascism did not exist yet and when there was fascism, the pragmatists were not around
anymore, either because they were dead or because they had completely changed their
cultural affiliations.
14 Vailati, who died in 1909, was much older than his two Florentine friends: he was 40 years
old when the other two, both 22, started Leonardo. He belonged to the school of Peano,
with whom he had collaborated on writing Il  Formulario,  one of  the works that were
fundamental for the birth of mathematical logic, and he had already taught three History
of Mechanics courses at the University of Torino. He was current, and he kept himself
current, on everything published in Europe in the fields of his interest, which expanded
progressively  from  mathematics  to  the  history  of  science,  from  comparisons  of  the
various sciences to the philosophical method. The results of this activity, which would be
rediscovered decades later, can be compared, at least in extent and spirit besides certain
assonances in the direction of his thought, to those of Charles S. Peirce. The friendship
between Papini and Vailati,  whose theoretical motives were so crucial, is perhaps the
secret of Leonardo.14 The great logician educated Papini in the truest sense of the word; he
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drew out  of  the  magma  of  Papinian  needs  a  minimum of  philosophical  and  critical
structure without substituting his own ideas to those of his friend, for whom he always
had  respect  and  admiration.  Vailati  commented  on  Papini’s  work  in  every  issue  of
Leonardo,  correcting,  reproaching,  but always trying to underline the direction which
would keep Leonardo both disruptive and precise at the same time. Papini, as we know, did
not always follow Vailati’s suggestions, but this does not mean that he was not influenced
by the teachings of his friend and mentor. Vailati’s stay in Florence from 1904 to 1905,
due to his nomination by the Academy of the Lincei to coordinate the national edition of
Torricelli’s  works,  is  perhaps  the  most  interesting  period  of  Leonardo,  when  foreign
authors met and conversed with Italians and among themselves. It was here that Papini’s
plans for a true culture outside academia found most success.
15 Calderoni was the only true student of Vailati. Born in Ferrara, he graduated in law at
Pisa in 1901, with a thesis on positive science and criminal law, where he had already
expounded his thoughts on the themes of personal responsibility, voluntariness in action,
and the role of  belief  in determining voluntary actions.  These themes,  elaborate and
precise,  would  return  in  his  later  reflections,  influenced  by  Vailati  and  inspired  by
pragmatism,  and bound in  particular  to  Peirce’s  pragmatic  maxim;  Calderoni  in  fact
maintained that voluntary action is that which can be modified by the beliefs that foresee
the effects of it. It would be Calderoni who led Leonardo, with the writings “Le varietà del
Pragmatismo [The varieties of pragmatism]” (L II/3, November 1904) and “Variazioni sul
Pragmatismo [Variations on pragmatism]” (L III/1, February 1905), to the discussion with
Prezzolini about the meaning or meanings to be given to the term “pragmatism.” But it
was  not  only  with  pragmatism  that  Calderoni  occupied  himself:  he  wrote  about
psychology, epistemology, the theory of perception, law, politics, morality, economics; in
short, he focused on empirical and social sciences, as much on theoretical issues as on
practical.15 It can be said that among the Italian protagonists, he was the one who, strong
in the methodological lessons learned from Peirce and Vailati and his law studies, tried to
extend pragmatism and its methods to the social sciences. Indeed, his most important
and  well-known  work,  “Disarmonie  economiche  e  disarmonie  morali  [Economic
disharmonies  and  moral  disharmonies],”  published  in  1906,  tries  to  apply  certain
principles and acquisitions of political economics to ethics. Whether his way of treating
the  themes  of  ethics  and normativity  was  satisfactory  is,  however,  dubious,  but  the
originality of his attempt is undisputed and did not fail to arouse heated debates (engaged
in by  Croce,  among others).  With his  mentor  Vailati,  Calderoni  also  wrote  essays  of
notable acumen and clarity, such as “Le origini e l’idea fondamentale del Pragmatismo
[The origins and fundamental idea of pragmatism]” and “Il Pragmatismo e ivarimodi di
non dirniente [Pragmatism and Various Ways of Saying Nothing],” but a premature death
in 1914 hindered him from bringing to fruition and articulating in the best way his many
provocative ideas that were already influencing the whole Italian cultural environment.16
 
II. What Did the Italian Pragmatists Understand of
American Pragmatism?
16 Perhaps we should note the differences because the cliché of the critics, sometimes with
very different connotations and slants,  is  that Papini  and Prezzolini  understood very
little, borrowing only a few confused concepts from James, while Vailati and Calderoni
had grasped the essence of pragmatism, albeit only in the Peircean sense. However, we
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think that, their strong differences aside, the four men shared the same understanding of
pragmatism. Therefore, putting aside their individual philosophies, we want to see what
aspects of original pragmatism might have emerged to the eyes of a Leonardo reader.
17 At first glance, it seems that very little remains of American pragmatism. The Italian
pragmatists mixed pragmatism with Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, with Saint Teresa and
Pascal, with Kierkegaard and the occultists. On the other hand, in Leonardo one reads
essays on Russell and Poincaré, Pikler and Duhem, Brentano and Juvalta. Each author,
taken singly, could be said to have a connection with pragmatism, but all together they
seem truly far from an organic whole.
18 In addition, there was a limited understanding of the subtle distinctions between James
and Peirce and, even less, of the single systems of the one and the other. The pragmatism
they knew about seems more composed of slogans than of reasoning. Citations of Peirce’s
pragmatic maxim appear continuously, with all the misinterpretations of utilitarianism
and arbitrariness that it had already aroused in the United States. Then there is Vailati’s
critique of “What is Pragmatism?,” Peirce’s article published in “The Monist” in April of
1905.  Leonardo  published  James’s  “La  concezione  della  coscienza  [The  conception  of
consciousness]” from the conference in Rome (L III/3, June-August 1905), his “Le energie
degli uomini [The energies of men]” (L III/I, February 1905) and various reviews. James is
much more present than Peirce, but in his case as well one finds in Leonardo all the classic
impressions due to the doctrine of the “will to believe,” an “unlucky” title according to
James himself (James 1967: 457), as it inspired an infinite number of misunderstandings
and  misinterpretations.  Dewey  is  cited  five  times  and  Lady  Welby  twice.  Instead,
appearing many times are Bergson, with whom Prezzolini had a constant and personal
relationship, Schiller and Unamuno, the latter a bit forcedly but significantly counted
among  the  pragmatists.  The  richness  of  these  last  relationships  brings  to  mind  the
possibility  of  identifying  a  common  matrix,  if  one  exists,  of  the  European  or
“Mediterranean”  version  of  pragmatism,  and  gives  an idea  of  the  vast  “pragmatist”
frequentation that a Leonardo reader was able to have. It could be said, in short, that, as
much as extension, Leonardo provided unique knowledge for its time.
19 As for depth of understanding, the tools were insufficient if one wanted to understand
the Jamesian system and even more so, the Peircean. This weakness was not a small one:
if the Italian pragmatists were not unfaithful in reporting and working out what they
knew, they still did not grasp some of the deeper provocations found in the works of the
American masters and simply missed, at times, the connection between the novelty of
pragmatism and the historical antecedents which the American pragmatists thought they
were connecting with.  They defined personal  historical  antecedents but  this  was the
cause of the majority of the misunderstandings by the critics and there often was not a
philosophical horizon wider and deeper around which to place the problems that they
treated.
20 The decisive element, however, is that, even though the previous observations remain
true  (noted  by  all  critics,  then  and  now)  the  Leonardians  grasped  the  essence  of
pragmatism much more than the majority of their critics admits. There is one point that
unites  the apparently distant  philosophies  of  Peirce and James:  anticartesianism,  the
rejection  of  rationalism  as  much  as  empiricism,  seen  as  an  impoverishment  of  the
richness of experience17 (see the critique of Descartes in the issue dated 27 January 1903:
“Criticism of the world is, in him, a preliminary step and nothing more”). From this point
of view the articles “I dispregiatori del pragmatismo [The disparagers of pragmatism]” (L
The Sign of the Four
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-1 | 2011
6
III/4, October-December 1905) and “Cronaca pragmatista [Pragmatist Chronicle]” (L IV/5,
February  1906)  are  essential;  there  were  certainly  differences  between  the  Italian
pragmatists, but they were all sure of one thing: the necessity of starting from experience
as it is.
The pragmatist sees the world as a collection of facts to which he gives a neutral
collective  name:  for  example  ‘things,’  without  saying  if  it  is  spirit,  matter,  or
something  similar.  Standing  before  this  world,  he  says:  I  observe  that  certain
classes of things change when certain others change. Among the others there is a
certain class of things that I will call beliefs, and when they change also change
certain other things to which they refer. And that’s it! (L IV/5, February 1906)
21 Jamesian psychology and Peircean logic reject the vision of  an inquiry starting from
methodic doubt. The only doubt is the living one – according to Peirce – the one that
relieves an intellectual and moral uneasiness and dissatisfaction that must be overcome.
It is useless to pretend to doubt things that we do not doubt at all,  in order to then
recover them with a chain of reasoning starting from an empirical or rational primum
that one must postulate a priori in order to then construct a chain of reasoning from it.
Such a chain will only be as strong – not very – as its weakest link (W2: 212-7). Human
reason, on the contrary, starts from a given experience, about which it is certain, and
which can be shaken by events and by theoretical and practical problems, but which must
be recovered. Reasoning that departs from such an experience does not resemble a chain,
but rather a rope, whose strength is due to the sum and the braiding of its threads. This
simple observation often escaped the critics, not least because it could not be included in
these terms by the protagonists of Leonardo, who, as far as we know, did not know the
first  “pragmatist”  document,  the  “anticartesian”  series  that  Peirce  published  in  the
“Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy” between 1868 and 1869,  where  the  anticartesian
nucleus of his thought was affirmed (W2: 193-241). The one with the deepest awareness of
the value of experience was Vailati, who in psychology saw the trait d’union between the
refined theory of scientific discovery that Peirce followed and the will to believe that
aroused  enthusiasm  in  the  followers  of  James,  and  compares  the  various  sciences,
physical and moral, to them – trying to show the internal structure of this “rope” that is
reasoning.  Vailati  understood the typical  characteristics  of  experience  intended in  a
pragmatist way. As a matter of fact, in contrast to any pre-analytical standard, Vailati
held a historical view of truth.
The scholar who will not care about anything but the actual state of his science, as
far  as  competence  to  judge  the  importance  that  actual  research  or  evidence
processes (that are now competing) can reach, is in a position similar to a geometer
who would like to determine the trend of a curve knowing only one point or one
linear element of it. (S2: 6)
22 Vailati’s understanding of the evolutionistic turn of philosophy was as deep as his firm
holding  an  absolute  normative  value  of  truth.  Truth is  in  evolution  because  human
theories change, but their changing is not an evidence for relativism but a progressive
attunement with reality. Peirce would have said: an attunement that would be reached in
the long run of inquiry. Vailati commented this idea in his letter to Papini written on the
22nd of July 1903:
If I did not fear to adventure into the regions of metaphysics and to scandalize you
too much, I would say that not only truths exist […] independently from human
opinions (of whomever), but that they are the only things that exist in that way
(i.e.,  to believe that a body exists is equivalent to believe that some expectative
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would  be  satisfied  […]  if  we  had it,  and it  seems to  me that  it  does  not  imply
anything else). “Reality” is only another name for “truth.” (Vailati 1971: 362)
23 Correctly Vailati underlines that this criterion of truth is a new way to maintain the
ancient adaequatiorei et intellectus; a new way which is formally different as substantially
close  to  the  Aristotelian  or  Thomistic  version.  Still,  this  formulation  stresses  the
importance  of  evolution,  and  therefore  the  event  of  truth.  Truth  is  something  that
happens  to  an idea,  as  James would have said.  This  is  why Vailati’s  view cannot  be
equated with any analytic or empiricist pattern: sense and meaning of a term or of a
proposition can never be saturated before the end of inquiry. The concept of truth is so
wide to avoid both rationalism and empiricism and it brings a radical critique of any form
of reductionism, in particular of the ontologization of analytic propositions (S1: 130-33).
There are no a priori necessary truths: truth would be accomplished in the conditional
future of experience.
24 This version of truth definitely overtakes any dichotomy between ideas and facts, as far
as both evolve and can change reality up to the perfect attunement of the long run.
[…] this world of paper to which Galileo despised so much, the world of ideas and
human imagination, is neither less real nor less sensitive nor worth studying or
intelligent observing than the other world to which he dedicated his mind with so
great success. Opinions, whether true or false, are always facts, and as facts they
deserve and claim to be object of  inquiry,  tests,  and explanation exactly as any
other order of facts. And with the same end: through their varieties, through their
complex structure and transformation, the end is to determine constant elements,
uniformities, and laws to which they ought their dynamics. (S2: 4)
25 But also Papini, Prezzolini and Calderoni, each in their own way, rejected the idea of the
indubitable epistemological primumand because of this, found a theoretical unity in their
attack of both positivism and idealism. If they had been able to and had wanted to delve
deeper  into  the  writings  of  Peirce  and  James,  they  would  have  discovered  all  the
phenomenological, semiotical and metaphysical depth that such visions involved, as well
as their intrinsic and subtle differences. They attested, instead, to the pragmatic maxim
and the “will to believe,” they understood them and discussed them: in this lies both their
strength and their weakness.
 
III. What Did the Italian Pragmatists Add to American
Pragmatism?
26 Italian pragmatists added to American pragmatism a personalistic existential tone and a
nihilist disquiet. See Leonardo n. 2 of 1903 in which Papini asserts: “We will retain a single
ambition: complete possession of reality.” Or Vailati’s letter in which he declares himself
fully in agreement with Papini in his need for agreement between thought and action:
Dear Papini, 
Upon my return from Bologna,  I  found your letter  in Crema and now here the
magnificent issue of  Leonardo.  Your article  “Marta e  Maria [Martha and Mary],”
especially  on  page  7,  column  2,  clarified  for  me  your  way  of  seeing  and
understanding the philosophy even more wonderfully and energetically than any of
your previous writing has done. There are those who have dreamed that which they
couldn’t achieve and those who have achieved – or made it possible to achieve –
that which no-one (and they less than others) has ever even dreamed of wanting.
Now it is necessary the rising of those who proclaim that “doing” and “being able to
do” only have value if they serve to “realize a dream” and that dreams only have
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value  if  one  may  hope  to  have  the  strength  and  means  to  realize  them.  The
simultaneous recognition of  both these two requirements is  much more than is
needed  to  give  substance  and  life  to  a  new  orientation  of  the  philosophical
speculation; this has had and can have no higher scope. (Vailati 1971: 397)
27 In this ambition rests all their existentialism, which finds its prophets in the mystics and
nihilists because all of them wanted a life that was intense, full, theoretical and practical
at the same time. Respect for religious experience should be read in this sense, for Croce
as well, whose idealism the pragmatists disdained as much as they loved his acumen in
the details and his non-academic writing.
28 Existential personalism describes the love for the most complete aspirations of the mind
experienced in vital particulars. Underlining the importance of the particular and the
distinction between particulars as criteria to identify the meaning of  statements is  a
constant characteristic of all the Italian pragmatists. Distinguishing means finding the
true particular, vibrating with life, those that unite thought and action, separating them
from what is universal and empty or generic or deprived of enough strength to become
action. The spirit’s “desire to incarnate” which the idealists spoke about and which was
especially urgent in Papini can also be found in the others, although in a less marked
form. One must consider that this aspect of the person or of the individual was absent
from American pragmatism, according to which the person is the result of a complex
intersection of forces (physical, mental, intellectual) that move reality and thought and
that, from a metaphysical point of view, rest either on different modalities of the same
reality  (Peirce)18 or  on  ultimate  unities  of  experience  that  have  nothing  to  do  with
individual  consciousness  (James).19 In this  sense Italian pragmatism modified original
pragmatism and involved taking a personal stance that James, much admired by them,
pointed out  in a  letter  to Papini  saying that  the Italian pragmatists  had taught  him
“courage” (James 2003: 214).
29 Paradoxically,  but entirely understandably, together with the emphasis on singularity
and concreteness  in  which life  and its  general  laws vibrate,  one finds  in  the Italian
pragmatists a nihilist background, which one notices especially in issue 10 of November
1903 and December 1903: it is the suspicion that life lacks a true reason, a suspicion that
pressed  them to  adhere  to  pragmatism understood  as  a  reaction  of  the  will  to  the
absurdity of existence. Papini would express it years later with the figurative expression:
“I did not approve, I did not accept the universe as it was. My attitude was spiteful and
proud, like Capaneo trapped in an earthly hell.  And I tended to deny reality, to deny
copies of reality, a despise of the rules of real life, and to remake, in my way, a different
and more perfect reality” (Papini 1977: 233).
30 It is a Nietzschean touch that turns up often in the four pragmatists in different ways and
that  often  becomes  a  simple  “relativism,”  as  in  the  practical  realm  for  Vailati  and
Calderoni, according to whom each person can choose his own “table of values” and then
organize the means to those ends (S2: 91). Behind this vision there is, especially in Papini,
a certain reading of Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Stirner, Nietzsche, Bergson, in addition
to James’s Varieties of Religious Experience. There is also, especially in Vailati and Calderoni,
a reading of utilitarianism and English liberalism, of Bentham and Mill, but also of the
recent political economy. Moreover, from the epistemological point of view, we cannot
neglect the ideas treated by Newman and his division between real understanding of the
particular  and  formal  understanding  of  the  universal  (Newman  1973).  Nor  can  we
disregard the influence of Brentano, who was for many years a resident of Florence and
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often visited by the pragmatists, for the distinction between representation, belief and
will  (Dal Pra 1984).  The latter theme, the unity of belief  and representation, was the
source of  Peirce’s  semiotics  in “A New List  of  Categories,”20 which unfortunately the
Italian  pragmatists  did  not  know,  and  which  was  the  secret  root  of  the  unity  of
experience in Jamesian psychology that cropped up in his philosophical works as well.
The fact of not having recognized such a unity, we may suppose, is the true beginning of
the end of Leonardo from the theoretical point of view, the reason for which pragmatism
was  not,  in  the  end,  a  satisfactory  answer  for  its  Italian  supporters.  Existentialist
personalism and nihilism as love of the particular and suspicion of a complete answer
mark the peculiarity of Italian pragmatism for good or for bad. Being committed to the
comprehension of  the  particular  (in  this  Newman has a  certain importance),  in  real
understanding as opposed to a formal or notional understanding is the reason the Italian
pragmatists were so bold in their attempt to know and judge all that was produced in the
intellectual sphere. On the other hand, opposition to formal knowledge often resolves
itself in nominalism and in a consequent skepticism that at times seems to prevent the
possibility of authentic knowledge. In the last issue of the journal, Papini says that the
necessity of finding a reason to live is the most important thing to which Leonardo was not
able to find the answer. Perhaps because there is no answer?
31 Here the pragmatists’  paths  diverged:  Prezzolini  returned to  idealism;  Vailati  simply
stopped, as expressed in “La ricercadell’impossibile [The search for the impossible]” (L
III/4, October 1905), maintaining that the search for ultimate causes has the nature of a
utopian construct (which he compared to mathematical postulates); Calderoni remained
anchored to the impossibility of rationally deliberating on ends and values; Papini would
find an answer many years later in incarnation and Catholicism.21
32 The consequences of this type of understanding, personalistic and nihilistic, places be-
fore us different personal philosophies: at least in this sense, Papini was right when he
said that there was no Italian pragmatism, but Italian pragmatists. Love of the particular,
of the solidity of experience and the importance of the act of the will takes on a personal
form.
33 From a practical point of view, this translates into a perennial battle, typically Italian, in a
world made up of friends and enemies. For the Italian pragmatists, it was a matter of life
and death and, in a certain sense, the end of Leonardo marked their defeat or at least the
de- feat of pragmatism as an essential weapon of this battle. Calderoni and Vailati, who
felt this existential background less, were more disappointed by it, but even for them
pragmatism was a weapon against  superficiality and arrogance of  thought,  especially
academic thought. The struggle against the narrowness of positivism and the redundancy
of  idealist  monism are  the  emblem of  this  “militant”  version of  Italian pragmatism,
characterized by the “courage” to risk one’s ideas and the need to find “allies” among
thinkers from all over the world.
 
IV. What Did the Leonardians Not Understand About
Pragmatism? Or Rather, Where Is the Italian
Pragmatists’ Weakness?
34 In  their  journey  from  the  abstract  to  the  concrete  they  respected,  after  all,  the
epistemological terms of the idealists, as we can see in the editorials of all the first issues
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of Leonardo. “Personalisti e idealisti nel pensiero [Personalists and idealists in thought]” is
the  definition  of  the  first  issue  of  Leonardo,  January  1903);  “Un  personalismo  con
fondamenti gnoseo logici [A personalism with gnoseological foundations]” says Papini in
the article “Me e non Me [Me and not me],” L I/2, January 1903; overcoming life in the
spirit in “Al di là della vita [Beyond life],” L I/7, March 1903; the interior man as the
author of mystical creations in “Il segreto di Leonardo [The secret of Leonardo],” L I/8,
April  1903).  In this  case it  was Papini  who wrote and,  given his  young age,  perhaps
idealism was the only tool available to him. Nevertheless, Papini was not the only one to
reveal a certain inconsistency between a general philosophical understanding and his
epistemological attitudes.
35 The rationalism and irrationalism that  the personalist  and nihilist  pragmatist  of  the
Leonardians alternated between in the different sectors of philosophical research were
not able to dislodge the idealist gnoseological system that both Peircean semiotics and
Jamesian  psychology  questioned.  Thus,  there  is  a strong  difference  between  the
declarations  that  bring  to  light  the  anticartesian  core  of  pragmatism  and  the
epistemological articulation which often refers to the same masters of their “enemies”: to
Locke and Hume on one hand, and to Berkeley and Schopenhauer (through whom Kant,
whom they often criticized, reappears) on the other. It is interesting that Papini, in an
article in one of the first issues of Leonardo (“La favola del Sole e dell’Unico [The Fable of
the Sun and the Only One],” L I/9, May 1903) says that monism is in the will but not in the
act, that the world is not God, but is becoming God. Perhaps Vailati and Calderoni could
not completely share an assertion of this kind, but their decision not to take a position on
the  ends  that  each  one  chose  voluntarily  remains  in  strong  contrast,  if  not in
contradiction, to methodological pragmatism. In this context, it is useful to recall that
Vailati thought that deduction was the real tool of inquiry and he conceived it in such a
way to imply the pragmatic turn that any conditional formula includes. But in this way
Vailati had to accept that the principles from which we draw conditionals are postulates,
chosen according to an arbitrary will.  Peirce, his pretended American partner, hold a
very different idea, building a complete relationship between reality and our reasoning
both from an epistemic  point  of  view –  where  abduction and its  phenomenological,
aesthetic and ethic foundations play a decisive role – and from a metaphysical point of
view – where metaphysical realism is an essential part of the path of knowledge.
36 But also James would have never accepted an ultimate disembodied view of freedom.
Freedom  is  always  an  attitude  toward  reality  and  it  is  intertwined  with  the  whole
psychological  stream  of  thought.  This  continuity  between  reality  and  thought,  that
Dewey later articulated in his Logic, is the epistemic-metaphysical matrix of the “rope” of
experience. And Italian pragmatists never grasped it.
37 A gap remains between the choice of the means and the choice of the ends, which Papini
and Prezzolini resolved with the doctrine of the Man-god, Vailati  and Calderoni with
ethical relativism. In this way they left space for monism, whether idealist or nihilist,
which  they  wanted  to  oppose.  From this  point  of  view,  the  parabola  of  Prezzolini’s
thought returning to Crocean idealism is very significant.
38 Such a gap between the general intention of their philosophies and the epistemologies
they could  display  –  weak epistemologies  in  which there  is  a  methodological  abysm
between the choice of means and the choice of ends – could therefore be generalized by
saying  that  the  Italian  pragmatists  lacked  that  which  they  sought:  the  synthesis  of
experience, which they saw, lived and wanted to penetrate – or “possess,” to use Papini’s
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term – both in extension and in intension (“the intellectual empire of all the beings in the
universe” says Papini in the first issue of Leonardo). They claimed that they wanted to
know this synthesis or deep connection (especially Papini in the initial phase and in the
occultist phase of Leonardo) and, at the same time, did not want it (the mystery is the sun
that bewitches and blinds in “La favola del Sole e dell’Unico [The Fable of the Sun and the
Only  One],”  L  I/9,  May  1903)  or  that  they  did  not  want  to  occupy  themselves  with
problems that concern spheres where consciousness cannot go (Vailati). In the end, this
uncertainty proved fatal to Leonardo. When Papini wrote that there is no mystery, only
the unknown and the unknown is that which is not, he condemned the need to possess
that had driven him to a perpetual, empty search, forcing him to experience continual
changes and great dissatisfaction. The others were more cautious in their assertions but
there still remained in them this tension between a totality towards which reason tends
and an epistemology that does not allow one to try to know it and to discuss it. Thus their
philosophical attempts remain either incoherent or incomplete.
39 The theories that the Italian pragmatists worked out were not ever as significant as their
theoretical  needs  and  their  philosophical  taste  thanks  to  which  they  brought  an
important philosophical theory to Italy and introduced their readers to the real problems
of the philosophy of their time. One can say that, after all, they violated the most basic
rule of knowing, which Peirce had summed up with the phrase: “Do not block the way of
inquiry.” Papini blocked it  in intensity,  Vailati  in extension,  Prezzolini  and Calderoni
followed their friends and mentors, but the search never went so far as to fully confront
the enigma of experience, the profound connection between thought and the reality of
which it is a part.
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EP
The Essential Peirce, 2 vols., ed. by the Peirce Edition Project, Indianapolis and
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991-1998. The abbreviation is followed by Arabic
numerals for volume and page. For example, EP1: 348.
L
Leonardo. The abbreviation is followed by a Roman numeral for the volume, and Arabic
numerals for the issue, date, page. For example, L I/1, January 1903: 1.
S
Scritti of Giovanni Vailati (vol. 1: Scritti di filosofia; vol. 2: Scritti di scienza; vol. 3: Scritti
di scienze umane), ed. by M. Quaranta, Bologna: Arnaldo Forni, 1987. The abbreviation is
followed by Arabic numerals for volume and page. For example, S1: 34.
W
Writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, 6 vols. published, Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1981-2000. The abbreviation is followed by Arabic numerals for
volume and page. For example, W2: 49.
NOTES
1. Among American authors see Colapietro 1994, and De Waal 2004. In Italy the great exception is
the wonderful book by Santucci (1963), which has the single defect of being inevitably dated in a
field, like that of pragmatism, where studies have advanced immensely in the last forty years
thanks  to  the  publication  of  James  and  Dewey’s  Opera  Omniaand,  above  all,  thanks  to  the
cataloging and publication (not yet completed) of the Peircean manuscripts. The references for
those editions are the classic ones. The writings of John Dewey are published in The Collected
Works  of  John  Dewey,  1882-1953,  ed.  by  J. A. Boydston,  Carbondale  and  Edwardsville,  Southern
Illinois University Press, 1969-91. The main edition of James are The Works of William James, ed. by
F. Burkhardt, F. Bowers, I. Skrupskelis, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1975- and
The Correspondence of William James, ed. by I. K. Skrupskelis and E. M. Berkeley, Charlottesville and
London, University Press of Virginia, 2003. Peirce’s writings are published in C.S. Peirce, Collected
Papers of C. S. Peirce,  8 vols.,  ed. by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss (vols. 1-6), and A. Burks (vols. 7-8),
Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1931-1958; The New Elements of Mathematics, ed. by
C. Eisele,  The  Hague,  Mouton  Publishers,  1976;  The  Essential  Peirce,  2 vols.,  ed.  by  the  Peirce
Edition Project, Indianapolis and Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1991-98 (EP). The Peirce
Edition Project is working on the complete chronological edition, called Writings of Charles Sanders
Peirce, 6 vols published, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1981-2000 (W).
2. This view has been sustained above all by those who tried to treat Vailati as a precursor of the
neopositivist thought. Among others is worth recalling Marcucci 1958, Lanaro 1980, Brodbeck
1963, Facchi 1952, Barone 1963, Cecchinel 1963, Geymonat 1963. A second interpretative stream
has defended Vailati’s pragmatist identity opposing Vailati and Calderoni as followers of Peirce
to the others, uncertainly stepping into James’ tracks. Among those, with Garin 1963, we have to
mention at least Rossi 1923, Gullace 1962, Villa 1962, Zanoni 1979, and more recently De Waal
2007, and – partially – Colapietro 1994. More complicated is the methodological view held by
Harris 1963 and Quaranta 2003, in which Vailati is a precursor of methodologies that only now
emerge as important. In this Italian pragmatists were originally pragmatists but the only real
philosophical contribution came from the great mathematician. Another important book is the
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one written by M. Ferrari (2006) whose interpretation of Vailati is not centered on pragmatism,
but on his moral general belonging to European culture. Ferrari’s well balanced analysis casts a
light on Vailati’s debt to Leibniz and to contemporary philosophy of mathematics and science.
3. L III/2, April 1905: 45.
4. Hermes was a periodical founded by Giuseppe Antonio Borgese and Enrico Corradini in 1904.
They were interested in literary criticism and the painter Adolfo De Carolis was responsible for
the graphical aspect of the periodical. Papini himself collaborated with Hermes in many of the
twelve numbers, until the last publication in 1906. As for Papini’s Vincian proclamation, see the
introduction by G. Luti to the complete edition of Leonardo 1903-07 (Firenze & Vallecchi 2003). In
this volume it  is  possible to find the transcription of  the “Discorsoai  Vinciani” [Discourse to
Vincians].
5. “Presso di noi il Pragmatismo si divise quasi nettamente in due sezioni: quella che si potrebbe
dire  del  Pragmatismo  logico  e  quella  del  Pragmatismo  psicologico  o  magico.  Alla  prima
appartenevano Vailati e Calderoni ai quali moltissimo deve – […] – la teoria della scienza e la
logica considerata come studio del significato delle proposizioni e delle teorie. La seconda era
composta da me e da Prezzolini e noialtri, spiriti più avventurosi, più paradossali e più mistici
svolgemmo  soprattutto  quelle  teorie  che  ci  facevano  sperare  un’efficacia  diretta  sul  nostro
spirito e sulle cose” [In Italy pragmatism was almost exactly splitted in two parts: one that we
could  call  logic  pragmatism  and  the  other  one  that  we  could  call  psychologic  or  magic
pragmatism.  Vailati  and Calderoni  –  […]  –  to  whom theory of  science and logic  intended as
studies on meaning of propositions and theories are indebted, belong to the first one. The second
one is composed by Prezzolini and me, more adventurous, paradoxical, and mystical kind of men.
We developed above all those theories which made us hope for a direct efficacy on our souls and
on things] Papini, SulPragmatismo, in Papini (1977: 7).
6. See the introduction to Calderoni-Vailati (1918), written by Giovanni Papini.
7. Many  contributions  in  Maddalena-Tuzet  2007  cover  these  relationships.  On  D’Ors  and
pragmatism  see  the  chapters  by  M. Torregrosa  &  A. González  (p. 245-54,  255-72).  On  the
Unamuno-Papini relationship see the contribution by I. Martínez (167-8). About the acquaintance
with Bergson and Schiller see the chapter by M. Luisi (179-200) and the Appendix by M. Quaranta
(273-85).
8. Interview  with  Giuseppe  Prezzolini  by  Mario  Quaranta,  “Quaderni  razionalisti,”  n.  2-3,
primavera 1983, 77-84.
9. “Enrico Bergson, come tutti i maestri buoni, non può avere scolari, ma solo lettori amorosi che,
appena abbian capito, debbon buttar da parte i suoi libri e sprofondarsi, per conto loro nel fiume
dell’intuizione” [Henry Bergson, as any good professor, cannot have students but loving readers
who – as soon as they understand – must throw his books and deepen their selves into the river
of  intuition]  (from  the  introduction  written  by  G. Papini  to  Bergson  (1913:  3-4)).  See  also
Marinotti (1997: 149-78), SchramPighi 1981, Zambelloni (1970: 331-60).
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ABSTRACTS
This  paper  is  a  contribution  to  the  study  of  the  four  classical  Italian  pragmatists:  Papini,
Prezzolini,  Vailati  and  Calderoni.  They  are  seen  more  as  representatives  of  a  pragmatist
movement  than  as  singular  systematic  thinkers.  The  center  of  Italian  pragmatism  was  the
periodical, Leonardo, where these authors discussed and presented an original and provocative
understanding  of  pragmatist  philosophy.  Thier  understanding  of  pragmatist  philosophy  has
often been underestimated by the subsequent literature. They showed a good comprehension of
the  novelty  brought  by  American  pragmatism  but,  ignoring  some  of  the  most  important
epistemic aspects of Peirce’s and James’s theories,  their philosophical  proposals often missed
consistency.  However,  even in  their  misunderstandings,  they signaled a  need and possibly  a
weakness of the whole pragmatist movement. Italian pragmatists underlined the importance of
the concreteness of individuals in the realization of universal laws of mathematics and logic,
physics  and  psychology.  But,  this  attitude  suffered  from  some  serious  tensions  between
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